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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Danish Demining Group began operations in Somaliland in 1999, responding to a perceived
need at the time.
Over the following nine years, their operations removed significant numbers of mines and
UXO and removed countless communities and individuals from the threat of mines and UXO.
As time went on however, the organisation appeared to shift focus from a Danish Demining
Group, to an organisation with a different set of objectives.
That shift was initially away from mine clearance – understandable given the ongoing
removal of landmines – and subsequently away from UXO clearance/removal – again, an
understandable decision.
This report considers the programme from its inception to its closure. It looks at the
development of the programme, the inevitable changes any programme would pass through,
but also the more significant decisions made by DDG. While a number of the changes the
programme went through came under strong criticism from other stakeholders, the rationale is
explored in the report and, while there is little hard evidence to clarify, the report believes that
the decisions made were the correct ones for the time of the programme and given the
developmental stage of Somaliland.
DDG provided a strong presence and contribution to mine action in Somaliland and to the
improvement of the quality of life of many. Their focus has now shifted across to SALW
where it is believed that the impact that can be achieved from the resources available will be
much more significant than in the mine action sector. This is a brave move by DDG, and one
that should make other mine action organisations in some environments consider their
positions.
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INTRODUCTION
DDGs mine action programme was established in Somaliland in 1999 and ceased mine action
operations in 2008. During that period of time, DDG cleared almost 1.4 million m2 of land,
destroyed 91,000 items of UXO and 10,000 mines.
Of course, this is not the full story. While the impact on the communities that have been worked
with has undoubtedly been significant, a true impact evaluation is impossible to achieve given the
lack of reliable baseline data, and the number of changes in the focus of the programme. Such
uncertainty makes it very unlikely to be able to establish a meaningful position and thus this
assessment is based on a number of subjective views of stakeholders involved in this assessment.
Thus, this assessment aims to assess the reasonableness of the DDG programming and, where
possible, is supported by data to consider the programme outputs.

BACKGROUND
OVERALL CONTEXT
Somalia has been racked with violence and conflict from the mid 1960s onwards. The selfdeclared Republic of Somaliland broke away from Somalia in 1991. Mines were primarily laid
in Somaliland during the Ogaden wars of 1964 and 1977, during the 1988 – 1991 civil war and
briefly during a period of internal conflict in 1994/5.
The first mine clearance operations began in 1991 where a British commercial organisation,
Rimfire, was contracted by UNHCR & MSF to undertake clearance in and around Hargeisa.
Although the operation was widely criticised at the time, the work undoubtedly resulted in
significant reduction of the threat of mines and UXO around Hargeisa and in other parts of the
region.
In 1997, the UNDP assisted the Government of Somaliland to establish the Somaliland Mine
Action Centre (SMAC) with the intention of coordinating mine action issues in Somaliland.
Although established in 1997, it is generally acknowledged that the organisation did not begin to
become more effective until the last couple of years.
Danish Demining Group (DDG) began operations in Somaliland in 1999. The aim of DDGs
intervention was to reduce the impact of mines and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) to the
population of Somaliland. In the same year, the HALO Trust established a programme to remove
the impact of mines and UXO on the population of Somaliland.
In March 2003, a LIS funded by a multi donor group through the Survey Action Center (SAC)
was completed that attempted to provide an overview of the mine and ERW problem in
Somaliland. The survey identified 772 suspect hazardous areas, 357 communities affected, of
which 13% (45) were considered to be highly impacted. The work on this LIS was undertaken
by DDG, but the terms of reference for this study specifically exclude any analysis of the LIS.
The quality of data, then and now, however, appears to be unreliable and thus gaining a clear
perspective of the status quo, is difficult, with conflicting views on the scale of the problem from
many of the key stakeholders involved.
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ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE CONTAMINATION PROBLEM

EXTENT OF THE CONTAMINATION
The contamination from landmines and other Explosive Remnants of War (ERW)1 in Somaliland
stems from:
•
•

•

the Ogaden War (1977-78), resulting in contamination along the border with Ethiopia
civil wars against the Siad Barre regime – including the Somaliland Liberation War
(1988-91), which led to extensive local contamination along roads and tracks, around
military camps and other installations, and water sources used by the nomadic
population;
between 1994 and 1995 when there was fierce fighting in and around Hargeisa and other
urban centres as part of a civil conflict.

An LIS conducted by DDG in 2002-3 (a follow on survey was conducted in 2006-7 in the two
regions of Sool, Sanaag and several south-western districts of Togdheer, where security did not
allow access in 2003. The results are not yet available) indicated that 357 communities were
affected, there were 772 suspect hazardous areas and 45 highly impacted communities. The
findings of the surveys are summarised in Table 1.

Table 1 – Results from LIS 2003.
Region
Awdal
Galbeed
Saaxil
Togdheer
Sool
Sanaag
Total

Recent victims
(past 24 months)
72
119
32
53
Not surveyed
Not surveyed
276

Impacted
communities
59
155
58
85
Not surveyed
Not surveyed
357

Highly
impacted
communities
11
21
5
8
Not surveyed
Not surveyed
45

In 2004 and 2005 following a certain amount of scepticism immediately after the LIS with
regards to the results and indications, the two major operators undertook a more detailed process
of resurveying those communities identified by the LIS as being highly impacted. This involved
returning to those communities not previously surveyed and identified as being highly impacted
and undertaking more detailed analysis of the SHAs and their impact on the communities.
HALO & DDG called this process technical survey as a means of separating it from the extant
LIS data, but there was no physical intervention into hazardous locations at this point.
The DDG resurvey visited 30 of the 45 communities that had been identified as highly impacted
by the LIS. From these 30 communities, 92 SHA were identified, of which 6 SHA were
classified as high, 24 medium and 118 low impact. In addition, a further 18 communities
identified by the LIS as medium impacted were analysed to contain 10 high, 10 medium and 14
low impact SHA.

1

ERW includes unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO).
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HISTORY OF MINE ACTION IN SOMALILAND
The first formal mine clearance operations in Somaliland began in 1991 when a British
commercial organisation, Rimfire, was contracted by UNHCR & MSF to undertake clearance in
and around Hargeisa. Although the operation was widely criticised at the time, the work
undoubtedly resulted in significant reduction of the threat from mines and UXO to the population
living in and around Hargeisa.
In 1997, the UNDP assisted the Government of Somaliland to establish the Somaliland Mine
Action Centre (SMAC) with the intention of coordinating mine action issues in Somaliland.
Although established in 1997, it is generally acknowledged that the organisation did not begin to
become effective until the last couple of years.
Two other commercial organisations – Mine Tech and Greenfields Consultants – were involved
in clearance operations in the late 1990’s on a very limited scale.
Danish Demining Group (DDG) began operations in Somaliland in 1999. The aim of DDG’s
intervention was to reduce the impact of mines and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) to the
population of Somaliland. In the same year, the HALO Trust and St Barbara foundation
established programmes to remove the impact of mines and UXO on the population of
Somaliland.
In mid-2001, UNDP supported the establishment of two Police Explosive Ordnance Disposal
(EOD) teams (each with 1 driver, 1 medic, and 4 EOD technicians), which have since operated
from Hargeisa. In 2005, three additional teams were created and equipped, and in late 2006 these
new teams received additional training at the International Mine Action Training Centre
(IMATC) in Nairobi.2 These new teams are based in three regions outside Hargeisa, but appear to
be currently non-functional.
In March 2003, a LIS funded by a multi donor group through the Survey Action Center (SAC)
was completed that attempted to provide an overview of the mine and ERW problem in
Somaliland. The survey identified 772 suspect hazardous areas, 357 communities affected, of
which 13% (45) were considered to be highly impacted.
St. Barbara Foundation ceased operations in 2003. DDG completed its manual mine clearance
and BAC operations in March 2006, retaining only mobile EOD teams (subsequently re-roled as
VBVC3 teams), who also provided MRE and collect victim data. The VBVC teams were closed
down in early 2008.4 The HALO Trust plans to continue its operations (survey, mine clearance
and EOD) over the next 3-4 years.
In 1997, Handicap International (HI) began a Mine Risk Education (MRE) programme in Somali
refugee camps in Ethiopia. It undertook a Knowledge-Attitudes-Practice (KAP) survey in
Somaliland in 2002 and, based on the KAP survey and the LIS, began an MRE programme in
Somaliland in 2005, through which it provided training for the other mine action organisations
(DDG, HALO, SMAC, and the Police EOD teams).5 HI also distributed MRE materials (posters,
2

IMATC is supported by the Ministries of Defence of Kenya and the UK.
The VBVC concept is explained on page 8.
4
DDG VBVC teams visited over 600 communities four time each per year. They have recorded 42 casualties since
July 2005. DDG estimate they are capturing about half the incidents in the accessible districts of Somaliland, which
implies about 45-50 victims per year in the regions of Somaliland the DDG teams can reach.
5
Delivery of MRE, with the exception of large towns and via radio, was delivered mainly by operators such as HALO
and DDG VBVC teams
3
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stickers, t-shirts), supported a youth group and Radio Hargeisa to produce and air radio
programmes, and (in conjunction with the SMAC regional liaison officers) provided training for
80 village MRE committees.
There is no comprehensive surveillance system for recording new victims and monitoring
survivors and as such, the actual casualty rate is very difficult to discern.
IMPACT OF THE CONTAMINATION
In general, available data are sparse and unreliable. The LIS conducted in 2003 looked at four of
the six regions and identified 276 casualties from mines and UXO over the previous two years.
More recently, there has been a significant divergence in data as recorded by the SMAC and data
recorded by other parties. There is no viable reliable central database. For example, in the year
2007, SMAC recorded that there had been total of 44 accidents, resulting in 72 victims.
However, for the three year period 2005 – 2008, DDG recorded a total of 32 accidents and 72
victims.
DATA RELIABILITY
This is a matter needing some explanation. The data collection mechanism in the country is
undeveloped. SMAC have regional officers in the regional towns but the mechanism does not
extend to formal integration into the national database, so this data is unverifiable. Every month,
the regional officers report accidents back to the SMAC, but in an informal unstructured method
that is not entered in a standard manner and without any quality assurance.
Conversely, data collected by DDG is collected from the communities they visit as part of the
Village By Village Clearance (VBVC) process. In the early stages of the VBVC project, DDG
visited all permanent6 communities7 in four of six regions of Somaliland (Galbeed, Saaxil,
Togdheer and eastern Sool) and about 60% of permanent communities in Western Sool and
Sanaag). More recently, DDG has been visiting those communities they classified as high and
medium impacted based on data collected during the VBVC process that were identified by the
re-survey undertaken in 2006. There are undoubtedly casualties occurring that are not being
recorded, but conversely, there is a certain amount of scepticism as to the level of casualties that
SMAC are declaring.
Table 2 - Data collection mechanisms
Victim surveillance systems are inadequate in Somaliland. Estimates of recent victims appear to
be complicated because communities give inflated figures, perhaps in the belief that they will
make it more likely they will receive assistance. A quick survey of the various estimates gleaned
the following:
Somaliland (accessible areas)
•
•

6
7

SMAC recorded 97 victims in 2006 and 72 in 2007
the DDG Village-by-Village EOD teams have recorded 72 victims from July 2005 to the
end of 2007. DDG believes it is capturing about half of all victims, implying about 30-40
casualties per year

Somaliland has a significant proportion of nomadic population.
636 were gazetted during the LIS and a number of others that were not, were also visited
EXTERNAL ASSESSMENT OF DDG’S HMA PROGRAMME IN SOMALILAND
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•

•

the LIS, Phase 1 documented 276 victims in the previous 24 months, implying
approximately 135-140/year – it is however generally believed that the claims from some
communities were inflated and the actual number of victims is lower than recorded
In summary, the number of victims for accessible areas of Somaliland appears to be in
the range of 40-60 per year, with more than 60% due to UXO

PROGRESS IN CLEARING SHA
Of the 772 SHAs identified in the LIS, 30 have been cleared by DDG using conventional
methods and a larger number by the HALO Trust. This is only part of the story however. In
DDGs resurvey of 48 communities with 115 SHA associated by the LIS, only 8 were identified
as high impact and 17 as medium impact. These included 4 BAC tasks and 8 roads. 25 SHA
(22%) were discredited by the resurvey.
National Mine Action Bodies
On paper, Somaliland has a sound institutional structure for mine action. SMAC is officially
recognised by the Somaliland government as the coordinator of all mine action.8 It reports to the
Vice-President9 who also chairs the Somaliland Mine Action Committee (the national authority)
comprising eight ministers.10 This committee has, however, never formally met since its
inception in 2003
SMAC has 32 staff (including eight regional liaison officers and 10 in QA teams), who have
always been paid by UNDP. It has version 3 of the IMSMA system installed and populated with
data from the LIS, but does not task operators and has not been recording the survey and
clearance work done by operators, which is a serious deficiency. In the past there has been good
advisory support from UNDP but at the moment the post of operational advisor is vacant, leaving
a significant gap and a related decrease in momentum. In addition, the CTA has recently been
given responsibility for the whole of Somalia, and is based in Nairobi. He is therefore unable to
spend significant time in Somaliland.
Until 2006, the Somaliland Government had not allocated any funding to SMAC, which gave the
impression that SMAC was a UNDP rather than a government agency. In 2006, the government
did allocate $15,000 (but disbursed only $7,000), and had included the same amount in the 2007
budget.
Other Mine Action Bodies
HALO Trust has the bulk of the demining capacity in the country,11 with 430 local personnel and
the following assets:
•
•
•
•

8 manual demining/Battle Area Clearance (BAC) teams
4 EOD/Survey teams
4 mechanical teams
1 MRE team

8

Presidential decree 83/2003 dated 18th February 2003
Presidential decree no: 016/2004 of 11 March 2004.
10
The draft National Policy states these might include the Ministries of Rehabilitation, Repatriation and Re-integration
(MRRR), Planning, Health and Labour, Education, Information, Interior and Foreign Affairs.
11
HALO Trust in Somaliland is funded by Ireland, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, and the U.K.
9
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HALO Trust plans to continue operations in Somaliland until all high and medium impacted
areas have been completed. Their current estimate to reach this point is three to four years.
Handicap International (HI) works with their key partners, SMAC, DDG, HALO, and the police
EOD teams to develop and train members of teams in MRE. In the past, DDG EOD teams
received MRE training from HI in order to allow them to deliver effective MRE as part of their
VBVC programme. In addition, they are working with a number of communities to develop and
deliver “train the trainer” MRE programmes.
In 2001, the UNDP programme in Somalia assisted the Somaliland police with the formation of
EOD teams which were to be integrated into the capacity of the police force. Two teams became
operational in January 2002. These teams have expanded from the initial two, through to today’s
five. The teams in theory are tasked by SMAC but in reality are primarily self tasked and
respond directly to the needs of the communities. These teams are envisaged to form the national
EOD capacity in years to come.
DDG completed its mine clearance operations in March 2006, reducing its staff from over 120
personnel to 54 (two of whom are expatriates), those staff being focussed on Village by Village
Clearance (VBVC). It completed its VBVC project at the end of March 2008, although DDG are
planning to continue this project in a very limited way in South Central Somalia. DDG are
currently undergoing a process of transitioning to their new Community Safety Enhancement
Programme (CSEP). This project will initially operate within Somaliland.
In 2006, DDG ran a pilot project with the local NGO Haqsoor aiming to collect items from
private weapons stockpiles in towns and villages (the Village Stockpile Disposal Initiative –
VSDI).12 The pilot was successful and town residents turned over items from private stockpiles.
However, after consideration of a number of social and cultural issues, DDG decided that this
approach may not be the most effective method of reducing the humanitarian impact of SALW
and thus developed a new and different approach. DDG have obtained funding from SIDA for a
CSEP and this programme is currently being initiated.
This project differs from the VSDI in that the objective of the CSEP programme is not to reduce
the numbers of weapons in Somalia. The aim of the project is to “…promote greater community
safety & reduce armed violence through the self-regulation of small arms & light weapons
(SALW) within targeted communities” and to “…reduce such key local firearms-related problems
as spontaneous killings (the source of much inter-community friction & long-term conflict),
shootings, deaths & injuries, firearms theft plus accidents related to firearms in the home (all of
which contribute directly to fear & uncertainty), whilst simultaneously promoting a more
responsible, educated and restrained attitude towards firearms storage and use that gradually
act so as to stigmatise unrestrained gun-use, & promote long-term, sustainable community
safety.”13 This will be achieved by attempting to shift local perspectives and work with the
communities to develop a safer environment in which access to weapons will be more controlled,
resulting in a reduced level of threat to the population.

12

This built on a traditional mediation/conflict resolution project run by Danish Refugee Council (DRC) in conjunction
with Haqsoor that has significantly reduced reprisal killings.
13
“A Project Proposal to SIDA From DRC/DDG for the establishment of a Community Safety Enhancement (Armed
Violence Reduction) Programme (CSEP) In Somaliland”
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TRENDS NOTED IN THE VBVC PROJECT.
Although the VBVC was only formalised in 2006, DDG had been operating EOD teams using
similar principles since 2003. During the period 2003 – 2008 a total of 4,500 community visits
were made and there was a very clear trend downwards in the number of items cleared per
community visit. Figure 1 shows the average number of UXO recovered per community during
the period 2003 – 2008 against the number of communities visited.
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1000
800
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Communities visited

UXO per community

The trend is very clear in that the average numbers of UXO per community visited continually
decrease. While this of course could be because of selective visitations, the more likely scenario
is that the numbers of, and therefore the threat from, UXO within the communities is trending
downwards.
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Figure 1 - UXO per community recovered 2003 - 2008

ROLES OF DDG IN DEFINING THE PROBLEM
The terms of reference specifically preclude the consideration of the Somalia Phase One LIS, of
which DDG was the implementer. The LIS was, however, the first attempt to gain a strategic
perspective on the problem of mines and UXO on Somaliland. Following a groundswell of
feeling from a number of the key stakeholders on the ground questioning the LIS results, DDG,
together with the HALO Trust, undertook a re-survey which aimed to clarify the situation. This
process resulted in a significant reduction in the number of SHA – in particular high and medium
impact SHA.
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RATIONALE FOR DDG CHANGE IN FOCUS
Demining Operations
DDGs arrival in Somaliland in 1999 was in response to a perceived need at the time and was in
the same year that the HALO Trust commenced their operations. Work was undertaken with the
aim of reducing the impact of mines and ERW on the population of Somaliland. Table 3 shows
the statistics from clearance operations undertaken by DDG during the time they were operational
in demining in Somaliland.

Table 3 - Demining operations 1999 - 2006

Locations
demined
30

Locations
cleared by BAC
90

AP
mines AT
mines
destroyed
destroyed
685
17
9,08314

UXO
destroyed
10,917
80,679

Area cleared
(m2)
687,000
694,094

A follow-on (to the LIS) survey was undertaken in 2004-2005 by DDG and the HALO Trust with
the support of SMAC, in order to attempt to clarify some of the data and conclusions presented
by the LIS. The LIS data indicated a significant mines problem within Somaliland, whereas both
DDG and HALO considered that the problem was limited and manageable.
The findings of the re-survey process, which looked at a number of identified high and medium
impacted communities, are shown in Table 4. DDG revisited 30 communities identified as
highly impacted and 18 of those identified as medium impacted15 were and an analysis of the
SHA and the believed impact of those SHA were collated. The results from the survey indicate
that the 48 communities presented a total of 115 SHA, but that only 8 were considered to be high
impact and 17 medium impact.

Table 4 - Summary of DDG’s resurvey data

SHA Surveyed
High Impact SHA
Medium Impact SHA
Low Impact SHA
Sites Disqualified
Original Total
Net Total of SHA

Total Number of (Roads)
SHA
2
8
6
17
65
57
6
25
71
115
90
65

(Non-Roads)

(BAC)

5
8
8
12
33
21

1
3
0
7
11
4

Based on this resurvey, and a more general feeling that mines were not having as significant an
impact as was being suggested, DDG took the decision to stop carrying out mine clearance
activities. This decision has caused a certain amount of bad blood between DDG and
SMAC/UNDP. SMAC claim they were not consulted during the decision making process. DDG
believe that SMAC were part of this process. Although it is very difficult to confirm a process
14

This high figure is misleading. The majority of these items were found in a number of caches dealt with by the teams
and include several thousand AP & AT mines destroyed at the request of the Somaliland government as part of their
move towards Ottawa (or non-states actor equivalent) compliance.
15
The 18 were selected by SMAC, DDG and HALO as those considered to be the most highly affected communities
identifying by the LIS as medium impacted.
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that happened several years ago, it is clear that SMAC feel that they were presented with a fait
accompli rather than being able to form a part of the strategising process.
The decision was based on the results of the resurvey process combined with a more general
feeling that mines had less of an impact than was perceived generally and a feeling that the
funding received for mine clearance would be better spent on other activities. In 2006, DDG
considered that the resources being applied to mine clearance would better be utilised on
focussing on UXO clearance – given the success of their VBVC project.
This perspective also appears to be backed up by statistics with regards to accidents. All key
stakeholders agree that most accidents happen when tampering with UXO – not mines. DDG’s
internal data base highlights this, and is in accordance with recent HI statistics where more than
60% of victims during 2006 and 2007 were due to UXO.
A core element of this decision making process is the assumption that the HALO Trust will
remain operational and have the capacity to deal with the residual mines problem that remains in
Somaliland. This appears to be a sound assumption.
The final decision was based on a fundamental feeling that all indicators in Somaliland showed
that it was time for DDG to leave mine action – and mine clearance.16 This was summarised by a
statement made by the DDG Regional Coordinator17. He posed the unanswered question of how
a community would choose to allocate resources if they were offered the funds required to clear a
SHA close by to their village. He wondered whether they would choose to clear the minefield,
build a school, a health post, drill a well for clean water, or some other risk reduction strategy.
The suggestion is very strongly that there are simply better ways to spend money in order to
improve the lives of communities and individuals in Somaliland than by clearing minefields.

VBVC (EOD) Operations
Following the closure of the mine clearance element of the programme, the operational focus
2006 – 2008 became removal and disposal of UXO and AXO from communities, supported by
MRE. This was based on the following concerns:
•
•
•
•

reducing ERW threat in households (domestically held stockpiles);
reducing ERW threat in the community;
prevent explosives from the ERW being sold on the black market; and
educating the community of the dangers of ERW.

During the period 2003 – 200818, DDG’s VBVC teams made more than 4,500 community visits
and dealt with almost 20,000 items of ordnance. Figure 1 shows the clear downward trend in the
average number of items recovered from each community. Once again, towards the end of the
period of operation, DDG made the assessment that there were more cost effective ways of
utilising the resources they had and thus made the decision to shift operations away from VBVC
operations towards their CSEP operations.

16

Discussion with Nick Bateman, Hargeisa, 18th April 2008.
Ibid
18
Although DDG was not undertaking VBVC between 2003 & 2006, their EOD teams were essentially undertaking VBVC
activities.
17
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Table 5 - VBVC operations 2003 - 2008

Communities AP
mines AT
mines UXO
visited
destroyed
destroyed
destroyed
4,527
216
47
19,686

Total
items
destroyed
19,949

A core element of this decision making process is the assumption that the extant capacity in
Somaliland after they finished VBVC operations, assumed to be a combination of the HALO
EOD/Survey teams and the police EOD teams, will be able to provide the required capacity to
deal with the residual UXO problem in the country. This again appears to be a sound assumption
based on the very limited data available.
Commencement of CSEP Operations
Although DDG have not previously been involved in SALW operations, the organisation have
taken a strategic decision to branch out into this area. In Somaliland, while ERW are clearly
posing a problem to the communities, small arms appear to pose as large, perhaps larger, a
problem to the lives of the Somali people than mines. A significant proportion of the population
own weapons19 and current indicators of casualty numbers from SALW appear to be significantly
higher than those from mines and UXO.
The Community Attitudes Survey20 undertaken by DDG in 2007 canvassed nine communities out
of more than 600 in the accessible parts of Somaliland. The Survey recorded that there had been
46 SALW related injuries in the previous 24 months in just those nine communities. The data are
not sufficient to allow a full reliable extrapolation to the whole of Somaliland, but it is not
unreasonable to assume that the SALW casualties are many times higher than ERW casualties.
Residual capacity
A key element in the rationale for DDGs withdrawal is the capacity that will remain in
Somaliland after their withdrawal from mine action. By far the most significant actor in this is
the HALO Trust. HALO has stated that they intend to remain in Somaliland until all high and
medium impacted communities (as classified by HALO) have the threat of mines removed.
While this will leave some low priority sites, this will essentially leave a country where mines
present a very low impact on life.
HALO has a strong, well established and capable capacity and this was a major influence on
DDGs rationale. Without a strong operator to fill the shoes of DDG, there is no doubt that a
different decision would have been made.
DDG also believe in the concept of the police EOD teams and believe that they will be able to
deal, together with HALO, with the residual UXO threat in Somaliland.

19

DDGs Community Attitudes Survey in suggested an average ownership of at least one weapon
of around 80% and a reported 43 deaths and 46 weapon injuries in nine districts over the last two
years.
20
DDG/DRC, A baseline survey of Community attitudes towards Small Arms & Light Weapons
(SALW) in North West Somalia (Somaliland), Hargeisa, October 2007.
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OTHER ISSUES

Tasking and prioritisation
In theory, all tasking and prioritisation is done by SMAC. The reality is, however, somewhat
different. HALO, DDG and the Somaliland Police EOD teams are all essentially self-tasking,
although all operators ensure endorsement of their tasks by the SMAC.
IMSMA
Although SMAC is equipped with IMSMA version 3 (which was installed by SRSA), and the
data from the LIS was fully integrated, there appears to have been no further data entry, for
clearance, survey, or victims. A number of computer operators have been trained by GICHD but
have subsequently left their positions, leaving an extremely limited capacity which seems unable
to keep on top of most of the issues related to data management.
The IMSMA central database in Hargeisa remains just that – a single central database bearing
little or no resemblance to the reality of the situation in Somaliland. The operators have no copy
of, nor access to, IMSMA, and any encouragement for operators to report is tempered by the well
founded suspicion that the data simply do not get entered into IMSMA. This is reinforced by the
fact that the operators have been asked for their complete data sets to be entered into IMSMA
several times over the last couple of years.
The end result of this means that the national database is not a current national database and the
operators have been keeping their own record since they began operating. With essentially two
operators (HALO and the police EOD teams) remaining working in Somaliland, there is a huge
opportunity to consolidate the data and maintain a current view of the situation without too many
challenges. It is especially important that the victim data situation is resolved to ensure that a
clear view of the situation is achieved. This is something that needs to be dealt with as a priority.

CURRENT PRIORITIES
Perspectives of the mine action problem in Somaliland vary. The SMAC maintain that there is a
significant problem in the country that needs significant resources to be allocated to it. Both of
the major operators see the problem from a different perspective and believe that the problem is
entirely manageable – and indeed, DDG took this perception to the next degree by ceasing
operations in the area.

SPECIFIC ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED AS NOTED IN THE TERMS OF
REFERENCE
Has DDG’s approach effectively reflected Somaliland’s HMA priorities?
The priorities of the Government of Somaliland in reality appear to be driven by the operators
working in country. With DDG now non-operational in HMA, essentially HALO Trust is driving
today’s agenda.
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Over the last 10 years, it is difficult to define clearly exactly what the HMA priorities were.
There is an incredibly diverse range of views. The recent EU funded assessment of mine action
programmes in Europe presented the case that “… mine action in Somalia appears to have been
misdiagnosed and undersold for many years21” and stated that victims per capita in Somaliland
were several orders higher than the next heavily affected country in Africa, Angola. DDG’s 10
years of operational experience in country has however very clearly steered them to make an
operational decision to stop clearing mines, and subsequently, to stop dealing with UXO. They
believe that the mines problem, notwithstanding the evidence of the data, is not the most pressing
problem in Somaliland and that a switch to operating in the area of SALW may well be
warranted. This was an organisational position based on their perspectives of the seriousness of
the situation, rather than any difficulties supporting their operations.
While the actions of DDG in ceasing HMA activities in Somaliland will not rid the country of
mines or UXO, the pragmatic perspective they have taken recognises the fact that in most of the
communities that they have worked with, or close by, mines have become an insignificant factor
in the lives of the communities, who have developed (as yet not really understood) coping
mechanisms to deal with the presence of mines and which pose a lower level of risk to those
communities than the presence of small arms, or indeed the presence of a main road close by,
with fast moving vehicles.
DDG do not believe that mines and UXO present a high priority at the national level, nor do they
believe that mines and UXO any longer present a significant retarding factor in the development
of the country.
It is the opinion of this assessment that DDG are justified in the actions they have undertaken.
Have DDG’s activities actively supported the Somaliland Mine Action Centre
(SMAC) and the Police Explosive Ordnance Disposal Teams? What is the
impact of DDG’s support to SMAC, SMAC’s capacity and Somaliland’s HMA
programme?
DDG has worked extremely closely with the SMAC since it was formed in 1997. While the
SMAC struggled in the early days, more recent events have resulted in a more useful national
organisation. Over the last 10 years, DDG have worked closely and has made the majority of its
major decisions in coordination with SMAC.
DDG have also provided the SMAC with training in the form of:
• Training courses for medics
• EOD training for Police EOD teams
• Deminer training for 10 deminers
• Survey & QA training (General Mine Action Assessment (GMAA))
• DDGs conducted LIS for SMAC in 2004 and 2005 (not followed up by a GMAA, nor
entered into IMSMA).

21 EC-funded Mine Action in Africa: Volume 2 – Country Reports, GICHD, 2007
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Has the programme strategy been implemented in a technically sound and
effective manner (considering Area reduction, VBVC, information gathering
methods, etc.)?
DDG have, in some areas, been extremely innovative in their approach to HMA over the last 10
years. In terms of mine clearance, operational conditions preclude the use of detectors because of
the high levels of mineral content in the soil and the prevalence of relatively deep buried
minimum metal mines which means that it is extremely difficult to assure clearance beyond 10cm
depth. No operator has been using detectors over the last 10 years, although HALO are in the
process of attempting to introduce new generation and multi-sensor detectors. This has meant
that the majority of clearance work has been undertaken by prodding and excavation techniques –
an extremely slow but thorough process.
DDG were quick to try “new” methodologies and were one of the first operators to undertake
clearance by raking – a process initially used by them in Sri Lanka. This led to a speeding up of
the process without any apparent reduction in quality. In addition, DDG were innovative in
undertaking “risk reduction” processes that involved risk reduction, rather than risk removal, for
communities. While this concept proved to be very effective in Somaliland, it was perhaps a
little advanced for the mine action community – a somewhat conservative group.
DDG have generally been responsive and forward thinking about their programme
implementation. Prior to the LIS, most of the work had been undertaken close to Hargeisa and
on demand from the local communities. The LIS gave the mine action actors the opportunity to
take a more strategic view (notwithstanding the ongoing debate about the validity of the LIS data)
and begin the deployment of operational capacity in a more strategically effective manner. After
a period of time where there was a realisation by the major players (DDG, HALO & SMAC) that
the LIS data may not necessarily be representative of the extant situation in Somaliland, these
players focused their work on clarification of the key elements of the impact by undertaking a
resurvey of the high, and a number of the medium impact areas.
As the results from the resurvey began to indicate that the mines problem was not as significant
as the LIS indicated, DDG began to shift their focus, on the basis of this, away from mine
clearance, towards UXO clearance, in the form of the VBVC project.
More recently, as the trend with regard the items of UXO being dealt with by the VBVC teams
continued downwards (see Figure 1), DDG began to wind their UXO capacity down in order to
shift focus towards SALW operations.
Based on the available information and from the perspective of an organisation that questions the
humanitarian value of its interventions from an holistic perspective, the programme development
and strategy appear to have been well managed.
Have DDG’s activities been implemented in a complementary fashion with
other HMA actors?
It is difficult to assess how much interaction and complementarity there was in the early days of
DDG operations given the fact that only two operators remain. DDG’s relationship with the
HALO Trust appears to be, and to have been, weak, with little cooperation. While this may
appear to be a problem, the reality of the situation is that both organisations complemented each
other despite this real lack of cooperation and there appeared to have been no significant overlaps
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in operational activities. There is a monthly formal meeting hosted by the SMAC which appears
to be the only formal meeting of the two organisations. In the lead-up to making the decision to
cease operations in both mine clearance and the VBVC project, DDG did consult with HALO, as
they provided (with maintaining an operational capacity in Somaliland) a major element of the
justification for closing operations. Similarly, the relationship with HI appears distant, but both
were fully aware of each other’s activities.
Have DDG’s activities been implemented in a complementary and/or
supporting fashion with other humanitarian agencies in Somaliland?
The relationships between DDG and other key actors in Somaliland are, to some degree, well
established. However, the linkages are informal and infrequent. Beyond the monthly meeting
called by the SMAC and its key partners, there is no formal mechanism for complementarity and
liaison between mine action partners. Broader than that, the relationship between other partners
and DDG again, seems to be informal and infrequent.
Have DDG’s activities added genuine value to communities in which they
have been implemented, and if so, in what ways? Have the efforts reached
the most vulnerable groups in Somaliland society? What impact in terms of
poverty reduction for these communities have the activities had in addition
to reduced injuries and death (e.g. on rural economy and agriculture,
infrastructure, resettlement opportunities, etc.)?
There is no question that some of the communities visited have benefited from the work
undertaken, but there is a larger question in terms of the cost benefit of the work that DDG have
been undertaking in Somaliland. In a recent internal report22, it was clearly identified that the
activities of the last two years appear not to have added significant value and have fallen well
below the desirable cost-benefit curve.
It is not possible to conduct a meaningful cost-benefit analysis within the framework of this
assessment. It is recommended that a more detailed vulnerability/sustainable livelihoods
approach would be most suitable in order to gain a substantive understanding of the situation
here.
Inserted comments from livelihood expert Laura Hammond: (see full report in annex 3)
It is clear that DDG’s activities have added value in that those interviewed indicated that they
appreciated the MA work that had been done. In livelihood terms, however, it is nearly
impossible given the available data to determine in what ways the added value has been related to
livelihoods.
Livelihoods analysis in Somaliland has been led for the past ten years by the FSAU. Baseline
information for all parts of Somalia includes data that disaggregates the communities into wealth
groups, defined as people who depend on the same general set of livelihood activities and who
are considered by the community to be, for example, the poorest of the poor, middle poor, and
better off. This information was not used in the Impact Analysis, nor was any attempt made to
determine who the poorest or most vulnerable members of the community were, so it is difficult –
if not impossible – to say whether the most vulnerable have been engaged.
22

DDGs Community Attitudes Survey
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To examine whether there has been an impact in terms of poverty reduction where MA has taken
place, or changes that affect livelihoods overall, assessment questions should ideally have
considered such things as changes in the daily wage rate, changes in the overall average
household income (baseline info is available from www.fsausomali.org that could be compared
with data in the target communities), development of public and private infrastructure, and
incidence of resettlement.
As stated above, it is difficult to determine the impact of MA on poverty reduction, but
livelihoods analysis with wealth groups could help to determine whether, in areas where DDG
has been working, there has been an increase in income overall and whether any of this is related
to increased use of area cleared (and possibly with greater security).
A word of caution here, though. Current conditions in Somaliland are such that these variables
are changing rapidly. Food prices have generally increased 40-100% in the past year. Fuel prices
are also at an all-time high. Wage rates have reportedly been depressed over the last 18 months
by the influx of internally displaced persons from south-central Somalia, and displacement has
also increased due to the threat of the conflict spreading north. Thus, in determining cause and
effect, it would be important to take into account these other processes, which may affect local
dynamics but which may have little or nothing to do with MA activities having been carried out
in an area. Conversely, a mine-free area may be attractive to people moving, or may help to
stabilize local prices if agriculture and livestock production can be restarted.
Note: It would seem to be important with respect to livelihoods to look at what the impact has
been on households who have suffered a casualty as a result of a mine-related accident. This
would be difficult to do in terms of interviewing sensitivities, but in households where an injured
member must be cared for, there is certainly a huge economic cost, and this should be seen as
part of the cost-benefit analysis when considering the economic impact (fewer casualties = less
loss of productive labour = lower health care and maintenance costs). This may be the subject of
a separate study, either in Somaliland or in another country where MA activities are ongoing.

Have the activities been designed and implemented in a gender-sensitive and
environmentally sound manner? If not, what improvements could be
suggested for potential similar activities in Somalia?
There is currently little guidance to the mine action industry on environmental issues. IMAS
07.10 (draft) is currently awaiting endorsement from the IMAS review board.
Inserted comments from livelihood expert Laura Hammond: (see full report in annex 3)
The Impact Analysis indicates a high number of female respondents to the questionnaires
administered, but this does not necessarily mean that women were well targeted in the MA
activities themselves. One way to see how women and men have benefited from the activities is
to disaggregate work that people do by gender, and see how much of that is made more possible
by MA activities. For example, we know that herding sheep and goats in fields near the house is
largely done by women and children, while pastoral men tend to take the camels further away to
graze. If the area cleared is close to the homes, women would benefit from this more than men.
Also, women collect water. If the access routes to water sources are improved through MA,
women will have to spend less time hauling water, etc. These hypotheses can be ground-truthed
through follow-up interviews.
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In what other ways (e.g. through the provision of short & long term
employment) has DDG actively contributed to society in Somaliland?
Employment for DDG’s employees over the last 10 years has undoubtedly contributed to the
societal benefit in Somaliland . Part of DDG’s concept of operations included what has become
known in some circles as “proximity demining” – the employment of local staff to work on local
tasks. This certainly contributed to communities from a financial perspective and appears to have
had a positive impact to society in the parts of Somaliland where DDG have operated.
•
•
•
•

Employment
Staff training and development
Transfer of work ethic
Donor profile

Inserted comments from livelihood expert Laura Hammond: (see full report in annex 3)
DDG certainly employed a large number of staff over its ten years in Somaliland. It can be
assumed that, in a country where unemployment is rampant (as many as 80% of able-bodied men
are not employed, and the number is higher for women), those who worked for DDG enjoyed
improved livelihoods over those who were unemployed. Additional information to quantify this
impact is not available. In the future, a programme like this could usefully conduct research that
compares the incomes of those staff with regular incomes with households that do not. Such a
study could also examine expenditure patterns, rates of attendance in school of children in the
household, whether employees share their income with other relatives who do not have an
employed member, etc.

Is DDG’s future strategy for Armed Violence reduction in Somaliland sound?
Based on the findings of the 2007 SALW Community Attitudes Survey of 9 Somaliland
communities, there are very clear indications that the impact that will be achieved by the same
investment in focussing on the SALW issues will be much more significant than if the resources
remained in use in the mine action sector.
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CONCLUSIONS
DDG have undoubtedly made a significant contribution to mine action since their arrival in
Somaliland in 1999. 120 sites have been cleared of mines and UXO and more than 100,000 items
of ERW have been destroyed. Communities which DDG have included in their VBVC project
show a clear trend downwards with regards to the number of UXO being cleared per visit.
Over the last nine years, DDG have been a key stakeholder in the initiation and development of
the mine action sector in Somaliland. The withdrawal of the organisation has caused a certain
amount of consternation within some parts of the Somaliland mine action sector. Part of this
could be ascribed to poor communications by DDG in terms of explaining to their partners the
full reasons for the decision. Part of this could also be seen as a slight to some elements of the
group who continue to state that Somaliland continues to need significant resources allocated to
mine action.
DDG based their programming around the perceived needs (by DDG) at the time and, as these
perceived needs changed, the programming direction changed. While unusual in the mine action
industry, this approach has the merit of honesty and DDG should be commended for taking and
maintaining such an honest stance. This perception allowed DDG to take some radical steps –
the closing of the mine clearance operations and subsequently VBVC operations while others
maintained that there was a need for their presence for example.
It is the opinion of the author that the actions taken by DDG have ensured best value for money
for the Somaliland communities and their donors. Some of their actions have been perceived in a
negative light and this may be a result of a combination of factors – poor communication with
key stakeholders and the fact that the decisions were based on essentially gut feeling rather than
hard data. However, in the long run, the decision to shift focus from mine action to SALW will
give a much greater impact from the limited funds available.
In addition to the hard impact that DDG have had on Somaliland and the impact that mines and
UXO had had, the intangible benefits are undoubtedly large. They have been a major employer
for almost ten years which has percolated money back into the local economy; staff have been
trained in basic skills and there has been limited infrastructure development. All in all, the
presence of DDG has been a significant and beneficial one for Somaliland.
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ANNEX 1 – TERMS OF REFERENCE
Terms of Reference (Draft v2.0 2-4-08)
Danish Demining Group (DDG) Somaliland
External Assessment Report
1. Abstract & Background
1.1

DDG has been active in Somaliland since 1999, and has during this time been active in
the implementation of humanitarian mine action activities on behalf of the Government
of Somaliland and various donors including DANIDA, SIDA, Norwegian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, EU, Rotary Denmark & Denmark Against Landmines (DML).

1.2

On 31st March 2008, DDG will cease its HMA activities in Somaliland and also conclude
a 2-year grant from SIDA (Swedish Contribution to the Village by Village Clearance
Project in Somaliland, D. Nr. Ur11 Yso/10.3DDG).

1.3

In accordance with DDG’s contract with SIDA and the 2006-2007 annual programme
review conducted in June 2007 (see attachments), DDG has agreed to facilitate an
external review on behalf of SIDA & the Government of Somaliland.

1.4

This ToR thus outlines the requirements and timeframe for the implementation of this
comprehensive review.
2. Mandate under contract

2.1

Under Article 7 (Planning, Review, Reporting & Evaluation) of DDG’s contract with
SIDA,
“an in-depth review and/or evaluation shall be carried out by 01st March 2008. The
parties shall agree on the terms of reference & procedures for its implementation during
the preceding annual review meeting”

2.2

Under the 2006-2007 Annual Review, it was agreed that,
-

DDG wished the evaluation to cover the 1999-2008 period & all programme activities
Funds were available within the budget to implement the project evaluation
SIDA wished to provide input to the ToR & would consider using the evaluation in lieu
of their own
The evaluation should include a consideration of the contribution to poverty reduction
(with an emphasis upon vulnerable groups), plus a gender analysis and consideration of
environmental impact

3. Scope of Evaluation
3.1

With specific reference to para 2 above, the evaluation is to consider in an honest and
objective fashion DDG’s contribution to humanitarian mine action in Somaliland from
programme inception in 1999 to closure in March 2008.
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3.2

Activities to be considered include;
a. Manual minefield clearance
b. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (both mobile Village By Village Clearance & stockpile
disposal)
c. Mine Detection Dog (MDD) activities including road clearance
d. Survey (GMAA & Technical)
e. Mine Risk Education

3.3

It is suggested that DDG’s implementation of the Somalia Phase One Landmine Impact
Survey (LIS) should be referred to but not considered in depth due to the potential scope
of study that this implies.

3.4

Specific questions to be addressed should include (but are not limited to);
a. Has DDG’s approach effectively reflected Somaliland’s HMA priorities?
b. Have DDG’s activities actively supported the Somaliland Mine Action centre (SMAC)
and the Police Explosive Ordnance Disposal Teams ? What is the impact of DDG’s
support to SMAC, SMAC’s capacity and Somaliland’s HMA programme?
c. Has the programme strategy been implemented in a technically sound and effective
manner (considering Area reduction, VBVCCC, information gathering methods, etc.)?
d. Have DDG’s activities been implemented in a complementary fashion with other HMA
actors?
e. Have DDG’s activities been implemented in a complementary and/or supporting fashion
with other humanitarian agencies in Somaliland?
f.

Have DDG’s activities added genuine value to communities in which they have been
implemented, and if so, in what ways? Have the efforts reached the most vulnerable
groups in Somaliland society? What impact in terms of poverty reduction for these
communities have the activities had in addition to reduced injuries and death (e.g. on
rural economy and agriculture, infrastructure, resettlement opportunities, etc.) ?

g. Have the activities been designed and implemented in a gender-sensitive and
environmentally sound manner? If not, what improvements could be suggested for
potential similar activities in Somalia?
h. In what other ways (e.g. through the provision of short & long term employment) has
DDG actively contributed to society in Somaliland?
i.

Is DDG’s future strategy for Armed Violence reduction in Somaliland sound?

4. Methodology
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4.1

In order to effectively answer the above questions, the following methodologies may be
employed but are not limited to;
a. Consideration of case study results from DDG’s Impact Assessment Project
b. Site visits
c. Community interviews including appropriate focus groups such as elders and landowners
& users
d. Interviews with SMAC & UNDP Somalia mine action
e. Interviews with relevant government officials
f. Interviews with representatives of the UN, INGO’s and national NGOs
g. Consideration of national & DDG database information & technical reports
h. Consideration of DDG proposals & donor reports
i.

Consideration of DDG technical SOPs

5. Timeframe
5.1

Due to restrictions in the availability of Mr Tim Lardner from GICHD, it is suggested
that the following timeframe is considered;
a. Agreement of ToR and other administrative details between DDG, SIDA & GICHD by
07th March 2008
b. Completion of information gathering and field work by 30th April 2008
c. Submission of draft of final evaluation report by 30th June 2008
d. Submission of final evaluation report by 31st July 2008
6. Attachments
a. DDG-SIDA Somaliland Village by Village EOD Project Proposal (April 2006 to March
2008)
b. DDG-SIDA Somaliland Village by Village EOD Project Contract (Swedish Contribution
to the Village by Village Clearance Project in Somaliland, D. Nr. Ur11 Yso/10.3DDG)
c. Minutes of DDG-SIDA Annual Programme Review 05th June 2007
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ANNEX 2 – ITINERARY & LIST OF PEOPLE MET
Hargeisa
th
17 Apr Arrive Hargeisa
DDG

Vicinity of Hargeisa
th
18 Apr DDG

Nick Bateman and Garad Ismael Isra
Visit to five sites cleared by DDG during 10 years of mine
action. Meetings in afternoon

Hargeisa
th
19 Apr UNDP
Somaliland police
HALO Trust
th

20 Apr
st

21 Apr

22

nd

rd

Apr

23 Apr

Somaliland
Action
(SMAC)
DDG
UNDP

Nick Bateman (initial briefing)

Mine
Centre

DDG
HI
UNDP
Depart Hargeisa

Ali Omar Ugaas – Programme Officer Mine Action
Omer Abdallah, EOD teams Commander
Armen Harutyunyan – Programme manager
Stanislav Damòanović – Operations Manager
Hassan Kossar – Operations Officer
Dr Ahmed Ali Maah – Director

Garad Ismael Isra – National programme manager
Ms Celeste Staley – UNDP DDR/SAC Programme
manager
Rudi Thirion – MRE project officer
Dahib Mohamed Odwaa – MRE project manager
Eddie Boyle - ROLS
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ANNEX 3 – LIVELIHOOD EXPERT LAURA HAMMONDS REPORT

Comments on Final Impact Evaluation Report
for DDG Somaliland
Submitted by
Laura Hammond
School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London and
Member, FEG-Consulting
Sept 2008
I have been asked by the Danish Demining Group (DDG) and Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining to comment on the ‘External Assessment of DDG’s HMA Programme in
Somaliland,’ Sept 2008, prepared by Tim Lardner, as well as the ‘Final Impact Evaluation Report
for DDG Somaliland,’ April 2008, prepared by Bodil Jacobsen to consider the information
relating to the impact of DDG’s mine clearance activities in Somaliland on livelihoods in the
programme areas.
In particular, I have been asked to consider whether the information available is adequate to
answer the following three questions in the Terms of Reference for the External Assessment:

j. Have DDG’s activities added genuine value to communities in which they have
been implemented, and if so, in what ways? Have the efforts reached the most
vulnerable groups in Somaliland society? What impact in terms of poverty
reduction for these communities have the activities had in addition to reduced
injuries and death (e.g. on rural economy and agriculture, infrastructure,
resettlement opportunities, etc.) ?
k. Have the activities been designed and implemented in a gender-sensitive and
environmentally sound manner? If not, what improvements could be suggested for
potential similar activities in Somalia/Somaliland?
l. In what other ways (e.g. through the provision of short & long term employment)
has DDG actively contributed to society in Somaliland?
The External Assessment draws from the Final Impact Evaluation Report for information
pertaining to livelihoods; no additional information on livelihoods was gathered during the course
of the external assessment. The External Assessment makes reference to the ‘general feeling that
mines were not having as significant an impact as was being suggested and a feeling that the
funding received for mine clearance would be better spent on other activities (p. 11).’ Therefore,
most of my comments relate to the discussion of livelihoods contained in the Final Impact
Evaluation Report.
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In discussions with staff of DDG, GICHD, and the DRC, it was agreed that generally speaking
there is inadequate information to answer the three questions definitively. However, I was asked
to comment on the kinds of questions that would need to be asked in an assessment in order to
solicit the necessary information, with the idea that this information might be useful to the
implementing agency (and to others engaged in similar activities) in developing an assessment
tool and training programme that would better capture the impacts of MA on livelihoods. Ideally,
such a system could be developed to be run and maintained by national staff. My comments and
recommendations are thus offered in this vein.
Before delving into the questions contained in the TOR, a general point should be made:
•

Generally the Final Impact Evaluation Report uses a very narrowly defined and
probably over-generalized definition of livelihoods. Given that 42.4% of the
households interviewed were urban, the definition of livelihoods needs to be
expanded to consider at least the range of activities that contributes to the overall
household income rather than just to income derived from agricultural and/or
pastoral activities. In urban areas this will include trading activities as well as waged
labour. However, even in rural areas, we know (based on FSAU23 baseline
information) that very few households are able to meet all of their basic needs
through pastoral and/or agricultural activities. For instance, in the coastal areas (the
Golis-Guban Pastoral zone, according to FSAU livelihood zoning information),
where people’s predominant livelihood activity is derived from raising and selling
goats and camels, the poorest depended for 25-35% of their total income on
employment (livestock herding for others, construction, other daily labour) and self
employment (harvest and sale of charcoal, gum Arabic, fodder sales, wild food
sales). Only the better off could afford to survive almost entirely from agropastoralism. It would be useful to know whether this is definitely the case in areas
where mines have been cleared, or whether agriculture and pastoralism have changed
in importance (positively or negatively) – possibly as a result, at least in part, of MA
activities.

Assessment TOR Questions
With regard to the three specific questions contained in the TOR for the External Assessment:

a. Have DDG’s activities added genuine value to communities in which they
have been implemented, and if so, in what ways? Have the efforts reached the
most vulnerable groups in Somaliland society? What impact in terms of
poverty reduction for these communities have the activities had in addition to
reduced injuries and death (e.g. on rural economy and agriculture,
infrastructure, resettlement opportunities, etc.) ?
1. It is clear that DDG’s activities have added value in that those interviewed indicated that
they appreciated the MA work that had been done. In livelihood terms, however, it is
nearly impossible given the available data to determine in what ways the added value has
been related to livelihoods.
2. Livelihoods analysis in Somaliland has been led for the past ten years by the FSAU.
Baseline information for all parts of Somalia includes data that disaggregates the
23

The Somali Food Security Assessment Unit. See www.fsausomali.org
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communities into wealth groups, defined as people who depend on the same general set
of livelihood activities and who are considered by the community to be, for example, the
poorest of the poor, middle poor, and better off. This information was not used in the
Impact Analysis, nor was any attempt made to determine who the poorest or most
vulnerable members of the community were, so it is difficult – if not impossible – to say
whether the most vulnerable have been engaged.
3. To examine whether there has been an impact in terms of poverty reduction where MA
has taken place, or changes that affect livelihoods overall, assessment questions should
ideally have considered such things as changes in the daily wage rate, changes in the
overall average household income (baseline info is available from www.fsausomali.org
that could be compared with data in the target communities), development of public and
private infrastructure, and incidence of resettlement.
4. As stated above, it is difficult to determine the impact of MA on poverty reduction, but
livelihoods analysis with wealth groups could help to determine whether, in areas where
DDG has been working, there has been an increase in income overall and whether any of
this is related to increased use of area cleared (and possibly with greater security).
A word of caution here, though. Current conditions in Somaliland are such that these
variables are changing rapidly. Food prices have generally increased 40-100% in the past
year. Fuel prices are also at an all-time high. Wage rates have reportedly been depressed
over the last 18 months by the influx of internally displaced persons from south-central
Somalia, and displacement has also increased due to the threat of the conflict spreading
north. Thus, in determining cause and effect, it would be important to take into account
these other processes, which may affect local dynamics but which may have little or
nothing to do with MA activities having been carried out in an area. Conversely, a minefree area may be attractive to people moving, or may help to stabilize local prices if
agriculture and livestock production can be restarted.
Note: It would seem to be important with respect to livelihoods to look at what the
impact has been on households who have suffered a casualty as a result of a mine-related
accident. This would be difficult to do in terms of interviewing sensitivities, but in
households where an injured member must be cared for, there is certainly a huge
economic cost, and this should be seen as part of the cost-benefit analysis when
considering the economic impact (fewer casualties = less loss of productive labour =
lower health care and maintenance costs). This may be the subject of a separate study,
either in Somaliland or in another country where MA activities are ongoing.

b. Have the activities been designed and implemented in a gender-sensitive
and environmentally sound manner? If not, what improvements could be
suggested for potential similar activities in Somalia/Somaliland?
5. The Impact Analysis indicates a high number of female respondents to the questionnaires
administered, but this does not necessarily mean that women were well targeted in the
MA activities themselves. One way to see how women and men have benefited from the
activities is to disaggregate work that people do by gender, and see how much of that is
made more possible by MA activities. For example, we know that herding sheep and
goats in fields near the house is largely done by women and children, while pastoral men
tend to take the camels further away to graze. If the area cleared is close to the homes,
women would benefit from this more than men. Also, women collect water. If the access
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routes to water sources are improved through MA, women will have to spend less time
hauling water, etc. These hypotheses can be ground-truthed through follow-up
interviews.

c. In what other ways (e.g. through the provision of short & long term
employment) has DDG actively contributed to society in Somaliland?
6. DDG certainly employed a large number of staff over its ten years in Somaliland. It can
be assumed that, in a country where unemployment is rampant (as many as 80% of ablebodied men are not employed, and the number is higher for women), those who worked
for DDG enjoyed improved livelihoods over those who were unemployed. Additional
information to quantify this impact is not available. In the future, a programme like this
could usefully conduct research that compares the incomes of those staff with regular
incomes with households that do not. Such a study could also examine expenditure
patterns, rates of attendance in school of children in the household, whether employees
share their income with other relatives who do not have an employed member, etc.
7. Another set of questions perhaps only tangentially related to livelihoods but relevant to
the question are: what kind of lasting capacity has been built up in the SMAC by DDG
collaboration? How well equipped are communities to recognize mine threats and to
manage them? How able is SMAC to respond to reported risks?
The Final Impact Evaluation Report mentions, quite rightly, that it is very difficult to
determine whether positive (or negative, for that matter) changes in terms of livelihoods can
be directly or indirectly attributed to DDG’s work. As noted here, changes will also be
affected by other things, such as the livestock ban that is imposed of and on (mostly on) over
the last decade by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States on import of live Somali meat, changes in
remittance flows from abroad (it is estimated that as much as $1 billion in aid is delivered in
remittances to Somaliland each year), and the degree of perceived security surrounding the
potential for the conflict in south-central Somalia to spread northwards. Also, even where
positive impacts can be attributed in part to the work of DDG in clearing mine-affected areas,
the knock-on effect is hard to estimate. For example, if an area is cleared, and housing
construction takes place on the cleared area, this will generate construction jobs and return of
people which will in turn stimulate market activity. How much of this should DDG take
credit for?
Questionnaires
I include here some additional observations about the questionnaires used in the Final Impact
Evaluation for Somaliland, which DDG asked me to review:
1. In the questionnaire used to gather information, as a very basic starting point, I would
recommend merging the Livelihood and Economy categories, or at least in the analysis
recognize that the answers in these two categories both indicate a livelihoods-related
answer. This would mean, for example, that in Q. 25 (Why was clearance/removal of
explosive items in your village good?), the total responses would be 759 indicating that
people associate the clearance with improved livelihood opportunities. In the analysis,
this will then become the single most important answer to that question (rather than
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housing).
1. The analysis of the Somaliland data should make the point that some of the other
categories (infrastructure, housing and resettlement) are also directly related to
Livelihood Outcomes (i.e. the extent to which people are able to make ends meet).
2. Questions 27-42 (‘Do you feel that anything has changed…’) are useful, particularly
when compared to the answers to 25. The fact that people think that MA has had a
significant impact on livelihoods-related sectors (Q25) but that overall the change hasn’t
been that significant (as with employment) might suggest that other factors not related to
mine clearance have actually hampered the employment market.
3. Although not exactly livelihoods related, I was confused by why in Q45, ‘Good attitude
between our people’ was a Security indicator, whereas ‘Good people here, there is trust’
was a Safety indicator. There needs to be either greater clarity between these two criteria
(Safety and Security) or they should be conflated as the results may be misleading
otherwise.
4. Many of the questions in the questionnaires are good and could be used again, but some
(the ones about perceived improvements/deterioration in conditions) need to be stated
more clearly, and the answers need to be analyzed in their detail. Just referring to
‘Livelihoods’ or to Physical Capital does not tell the reader what they need to know
about the issues.
Conclusions and Recommendations for a Revised Assessment Process
The shortcomings of the Final Impact Evaluation and External Assessment with regard to
livelihoods are not a reflection of poor work done by either assessment team. Given that the
authors of these reports are Mine Action specialists and not trained in livelihoods assessment
or analysis methods, there is no reason to expect that they would have automatically gathered
such information. In fact, the questionnaires from both Somaliland and Sri Lanka (which I
also reviewed for the DDG) are commendable in that they do seek to develop a relatively
nuanced understanding of livelihoods issues in MA focus areas. The criticisms given above,
and the recommendations offered below, therefore, are intended to help guide thinking about
ways of integrating livelihoods information better into the work of DDG, and to create
linkages between DDG’s work and that of the larger DRC organization.
In such an improved system of assessment, the following steps should be taken:
1. Rather than relying entirely on individually-completed questionnaires, use a
combination of focus groups (comprising different wealth groups, possibly
disaggregated by gender) and questionnaires. Most livelihood information can be
gathered more quickly and cheaply using focus groups with questions about ‘types’
of households. Another benefit of focus groups is that they look for ideal types of
households, and thus do not put the respondent ‘on the spot’ by asking them sensitive
economic questions about their own household. Instead, questions are aimed at
finding out ‘how do people like you make ends meet’ and the answers are debated
within the group so that the final response is consensus based (and can be assumed to
represent an ‘average’ answer). This saves time in the analysis and makes the data
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collection methodology and analysis more accessible to national staff with little
training.24
2. Analysis should begin by considering livelihood zones (geographic areas in which
most people rely on the same types of livelihood activities) and within those zones,
wealth groups. The chart below, taken from FSAU analysis, shows how different
assets of the three wealth groups identified are. In Golis Guban Pastoral Zone
(northern coastal zone of Somaliland), wealth groups are mainly defined by number
of animals:

3. Determine current scenarios for poorest and middle poor wealth groups in terms of
what activities they rely on for their livelihoods (%s and if possible amounts)
4. Include some questions about how people used to cope with mine/UXO threats in
carrying out their everyday livelihood activities and whether they still use these
practices.
5. Ask some questions about basic food and livelihood security – how many meals do
people typically eat in a day? What do they eat? What other essential expenses do
they have? Education? Water? House costs/utilities? Transport?
6. Discuss with interviewees the extent to which they attribute positive or negative
livelihood outcomes to the MA activities in the area.
7. Conduct ‘pair-wise ranking’ (a common tool taken from Participatory Rural
Appraisal) to identify priorities (for cross-sectoral assessments or to identify which
threats people perceive as being most important to their livelihoods (e.g. mines,
UXO, SALW, Livestock Ban, rising food prices, insecurity, influx of IDPs from the
South, etc.)

24

For more information about how to do these kinds of interviews, see The Practitioner’s Guide
to the Household Economy Approach, Save the Children-UK and FEG-Consulting, 2007.
www.feg-consulting.com
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ANNEX 4 – DOCUMENTS CONSULTED
•

SAC, Landmine Impact Survey: Somaliland Phase 1, SAC/DDG, Hargeisa 2003

•

Paterson et al, EC-funded Mine Action in Africa: Volume 2 – Country Reports, GICHD,
Geneva 2007

•

Jacobsen B, Final Impact Evaluation Report, Somaliland, DDG, Copenhagen 2008

•

Somaliland Police, Police EOD Annual Report 2007, Hargeisa 2007

•

DDG, Proposal for the continuation of support to The Village By Village Clearance
Project in Somaliland by Danish Demining Group from 01st April 2006 to 31st March
2008, Copenhagen 2006
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